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COMMENTS
THE DEMISE OF
THE DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
by R. Dennis Anderson and Dennis L. Lutes
With the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,' the question of the constitutionality of those laws which restrict certain
activity within a state on the basis of non-residence or length of residence was
opened to a new line of attack-the violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment by indirect infringement of the right to interstate
travel.' Residence requirements have been employed by the states to determine,
generally, what persons are its "citizens"-that is, those persons who
are entitled to enter into certain transactions with the state as sovereign.4 Such
activities include voting in state elections, obtaining a divorce, attending statesupported colleges and universities at lower tuition rates, admission to the bar,
candidacy for state office, and receipt of public welfare benefits.' Shapiro invites further examination of the constitutionality of residence requirements in
general, particularly in light of the recent application of its reasoning in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein.'
1394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'"No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'Another possible line of attack is that such laws deny procedural due process or a
privilege of national citizenship. See also note 12 infra.
'Perhaps the earliest such requirement in the United States is contained in section 6
of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: "[Elvery freeman of the full age of 21 years
having resided in the state for the space of one whole year . . . and paid public taxes during
that time shall enjoy the rights of an elector provided always that sons of freeholders of the
age of 21 years shall be entitled to vote although they have not paid taxes." Quoted in
textual material following PA. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
' The discussion which follows will not deal with the relationship between residence requirements and public welfare, a question which, as is now clear, was settled by Shapiro.
With reference to admission to public housing, the arguments against the constitutionality
of durational residence requirements closely parallel those employed in Shapiro. At least one
federal appellate court has found that such requirements deny to recently arrived, but
otherwise eligible, persons the equal protection of the laws in that their right to interstate
travel is inhibited by the action of the state in withholding housing. See Cole v. Housing
Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cit. 1970). Whether a requirement of simple bona fide
residence as a pre-condition to receipt of public welfare or admission to public housing is
similarly invalid is doubtful, although arguments against such requirements are by no means
unimaginable.
The questions involved in the area of public housing differ in one significant respect from
those involved with public welfare payments. Funds, no matter how limited, can be distributed proportionally according to family size, need, and related justifiable criteria. Public
housing, on the other hand, is not fungible and cannot be so easily handled. One commentator has suggested that while the application of a legislative blunderbuss like a durational residence requirement is unconstitutional, an objectively applied measurement of
local ties, including length of residence, is preferable to the application of a "first come,
first served" standard for distributing limited public housing. See Walsh, The Constitutionality of a Length.oI-Residency Test for Admission to Public Housing, 49 J. URBAN L.
121 (1971).
Several courts have held that a durational residence requirement as a prerequisite to
taking a bar examination is violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
See, e.g., Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster v. Wofford,
321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp.
1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970). These cases use similar reasoning and rely on the same authority
as the cases discussed in the other areas of this Comment. For that reason they will not be
discussed further.
i405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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The justification usually given for residence requirements is that they provide objective evidence of domiciliary intent and are, thus, a means of separating bona fide residents of the state from mere transients.! Therefore, some
comparison of the terms "citizen," "domicile," and "residence" is necessary, if
only for semantic consistency. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[aill
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
'8
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."
"Domicile" is generally defined as physical presence in a jurisdiction and an
intention to remain there, in the sense that the person has the intention of
making his permanent home in the jurisdiction.9 Although "residence" technically does not include domiciliary intent,1" the courts and the commentators
have used the terms interchangeably to such an extent that, for the purposes
of this Comment, we shall also. 1 The primary distinction with which we are
concerned is that between residents and non-residents.
In order to reach any supportable conclusion concerning the constitutionality
of residence requirements, two determinations regarding those requirements
must be made. The first is whether the exercise of state created "rights" such
as voting in state elections, divorce, and state supported higher education can
be constitutionally limited only to residents of the state. If this inquiry is
answered in the affirmative, the second question is whether a durational residence requirement is a constitutionally permissible means for distinguishing
residents from non-residents so as to limit the exercise of the "right" to residents only.
I. THE RIGHT To TRAVEL INTERSTATE

Although a residence requirement, whether requiring bona fide residence or
a given length of residence as a pre-condition to carrying out certain intrastate
activities, may run afoul of other constitutional mandates," the question of
"See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "Reside" was early interpreted to mean bona fide residence, i.e., domicile. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 9-41 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 11-23 (1971); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8
S.E. 596 (1888).
1o "Residence," strictly, means only inhabitance. See, e.g., In re Campbell's Guardianship,
216 Minn. 113, 11 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1943); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585,
155 P.2d 293, 295 (1945).
" At least one court has faced reality, noting that "residence" and "domicile" may have
identical or different meanings depending on the subject matter and context of the statute
involved. Kemp v. Kemp, 172 Misc. 738, 16 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1939). In most states, fulfilling
the residence requirement is not conclusive proof of domiciliary intent. See, e.g., Strandberg
v. Strandberg, 27 Wis. 2d 559, 135 N.W.2d 241 (1965); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
54.052 (1971) (domicile required even though statute speaks in terms of residence). The
terms "domicile" and "residence" will be regarded as synonymous unless otherwise noted.
" For example, the imposition of a durational residence requirement as prerequisite to
the exercise of the franchise in a state election may be viewed as an unconstitutional
restriction of the fundamental right to vote, quite apart from the obvious discouragement
of interstate travel. See text accompanying notes 50-93 infra. On the other hand, any durational residence requirement may arguably contravene procedural due process by foreclosing a newly-arrived citizen's opportunity to prove his bona fide residence. The irrebuttable
presumption of his non-residence is an impenetrable barrier to his taking maximum advantage of his newly acquired state citizenship. See United States v. Provident Trust Co.,
291 U.S. 272 (1934), in which the Court invalidated a conclusive presumption on procedural due process grounds.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

whether the imposition of such a requirement infringes upon the right of interstate travel must invariably be answered. Though the violation of the right
to interstate travel resulting from the imposition of a durational residence requirement is an indirect one (such requirements do not absolutely prohibit
changing residence to another state), the violation is arguably present in
every case in which satisfaction of a length of residence requirement is prerequisite to the enjoyment of the status of citizen in a state. Privileges and
rights enjoyed by other citizens of the state may be withheld because the person
has only recently moved into the jurisdiction. Hence, residence requirements
result in penalties being inflicted upon the non-citizen or the resident who has
not yet remained in the state for the necessary length of time.
The relative importance of the right to travel interstate in the hierarchy of
personal rights must have been considered minor prior to Shapiro v. Thompson.'" The precise lineage of that right, a right which was only restrictively
recognized prior to 1968, is relatively uncertain.
Extra-ConstitutionalSources. The forty-second chapter of Magna Carta makes
passing reference to the right to travel safely in and out of the realm. The
textual position of the reference suggests that it may have been intended
primarily as a guarantee of mercantile convenience. Yet, while the right as it
existed in 1215 is cast in terms of the right to pass across international borders
rather than the right to travel within the realm, the freedom is said to parallel
roughly the right to free emigration." The necessity of a specific guarantee of
some right to travel within a nation arises only within the context of a nation
composed of sovereign entities; i.e., a federation. It is not surprising, then, that
the right appears to be essentially a product of colonial America. The right is
an express part of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776;" in fact, that document characterizes the right to emigrate from one state to another as both
natural and inherent. The Articles of Confederation contained a similar provision forbidding any single state's interference with travel between itself and
sister states. Curiously, the authors of the Constitution and subsequent amendments chose to speak in terms of commerce rather than travel, and only with
reference to the powers of the central government rather than the right of
United States citizens to move freely within the nation. "
ConstitutionalSources. There is presently no doubt that the unexpressed right
to travel from state to state is tacitly part of that collection of rights which
may be characterized as fundamental.' 7 Although the Court has recognized
some species of this right since the late nineteenth century, its fundamental
quality, like its source, has not always been so settled.
" As previously noted, Shapiro breathed new life into the right by placing it within
sweep of the equal protection clause. See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.
the protective
'4 A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 214 (1968).
'15d.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
• . . among the several States .... " For an example of the interrelationship between the
commerce clause and the right of interstate travel, see note 26 infra.
17See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 94-118 infra. Thus, for purposes of application of the equal protection clause, laws

1972]

COMMENTS

The right of interstate travel is arguably implicit in the concept of a federal
organization of states. It need not be express as it is unqualifiedly suggested
within the four corners of the Constitution."8 The acknowledgment of the
5
right in case law came in the Court's opinion in Crandall v. Nevada,"
which
struck down a state tax levied upon persons who left the state by common
carrier. However, the right was not cast in terms of freedom to travel between
the states regardless of purpose so long as the purpose was lawful. Instead,
the right was limited so that federal protection against state interference was
extended only to persons en route to the seat of government." While Crandall
is invariably cited as the earliest authority recognizing the right to interstate
travel, it attracted very little attention until the right itself came to be associated with the post-Civil War amendments."' When, in the Slaughter House
Cases," the Court sensed some obligation to distinguish "privileges and immunities" under article IV, section 2, from the "privileges and immunities"
under the fourteenth amendment, as well as to enumerate a basic compilation
of the latter, an acknowledgment of the right appeared.23 Again, however,
the right was qualified and limited in application to citizens traveling to
Washington, D.C. 4 The viability of this interpretation became all the strongor official practices which discriminate so as to infringe upon this right are subject to the
closest judicial scrutiny. "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another ...
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966), citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1868).
"8The right to travel is so implicit, fundamental and elementary a liberty that it was
originally conceived to be "a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution
created." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966), citing Z. CHAFEE, THREE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185 (1956). The right has received
considerable attention on the international level also. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights includes the following passage: "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state." UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
art. XIII (1950).
"873 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
" The rationale was clearly to insure that no citizen would be inhibited from traveling
to the capital to petition the federal government.
1 For example, Mr. Justice Story's extensive Commentaries had given only minimal
attention to Crandall; within the work itself reference is twice made to the case, but only
by way of footnote. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1045 n.(a) (5th ed. 1891); 2 id. S 1072 n.(a). Only in the second appendix
did the venerable commentator ever speak in terms of the "right to travel" between states.
2 id. at 730.
2283 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
23 The fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause could easily have been
interpreted to prohibit the states from denying to any citizen those previously enumerated
rights which were before thought to restrict the power of the federal government only.
That is, the clause might have been interpreted as the great "incorporator" rather than the
due process clause. However, the clause was given a far less substantial interpretation, one
which merely prevents the states from interfering with relationships between the federal
government and United States citizens. It follows that the clause itself, as interpreted,
creates no new substantive personal freedoms or rights. However, a prior clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the "residence" clause, would appear to create at least one right
which then falls within the class of privileges and immunities of national citizenship; i.e.,
the right of any United States citizen to become a citizen of any state and thereby become
entitled to all the benefits conferred upon other residents of that state by establishing a
bona fide residence therein. See Meyers, Federal Privileges and Immunities: Application to
Ingress and Egress, 29 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1944). If so, then article IV, § 2 and the
fourteenth amendment would appear to overlap somewhat, as the former variety of privileges and immunities also includes the right of free ingress and egress to and from the
several states. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
4The acknowledgment took the form of a quotation from Crandall. However, the
opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, apart from importance as the Court's first extended
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er in light of certain dictum in United States v. Wheeler." There the Court
declared that the decision in Crandall had been based squarely upon the fact
that the plaintiff, who was taxed incident to his passage through Nevada, was
en route to petition the federal government.
The position of the modern Court has been to discredit the limitation placed
on the right to travel by these earlier cases. The reasoning of the Court in
1966" was that the dictum in Wheeler was rendered inapposite by Edwards
v. California." As for the suggestion in Crandall that the right was limited, the
Court's position was, apparently that the Crandall Court never meant to limit
the right to one peculiar class of travelers. "Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel .... [all have agreed that the right exists."2
Furthermore, it presently exists absent the limitations which earlier Courts
were apparently inclined to impose upon it.
Although Shapiro implicitly adopted the broad interpretation of the right
to interstate travel, its primary impact was a result of the characterization of
that right as fundamental for purposes of, in what has become a somewhat
trite phrase, the "new" equal protection test. Long overshadowed by the pervasive sweep of the due process clause, the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws has lately become the cutting edge of the constitutional sword."
Until relatively recently, the Court's reluctance to interfere with state business
was reflected in the test used to determine whether a state was denying to any
person the equal protection called for by the fourteenth amendment-denial
of equal protection was permitted if the practice was reasonable in relation to
some legitimate state goal."0 In practice, the presumption in favor of the state
operated to make intervention by the Court difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain. Contemporary concern with the protection of individual rights led to
a more stringent test. Essentially, the new equal protection stands as a prima
facie prohibition against those state classifications which are based upon some
"suspect" criterion or which inhibit the exercise of some "fundamental" right.
The presumption of invalidity may be rebutted only by a demonstration that
the classification is necessary to further a compelling state interest. In practice,
commentary on the equal protection, due process, and privileges and immunities clauses of
the fourteenth amendment, appears to be the first to find a particular constitutional source
for the right to travel. Mr. Justice Story's failure to give more attention to the right of
travel within the context of the Slaughter House Cases is, unlike his only passing attention
to Crandall, explainable. His treatise went to press prior to the decision in the Slaughter
House Cases; thus, his examination of the right as one of those rare and elusive privileges
and immunities of national citizenship was relegated to an appendix, in which he did quote
from the case at length. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 21, at 723-33.
25254 U.S. 281 (1920).
26United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Guest also illustrates the interrelationship of the commerce power and the personal right of interstate travel. "[T]he federal
commerce power authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from
violations of civil rights that impinge on their free movement ....
383 U.S. at 759, citing,
inter alia, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
27314 U.S. 160 (1941).
26 383 U.S. at 759.
2' See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). To characterize the concept
as new, however, is misleading in view of the fact that the novelty of a point of constitutional law wears thin after more than twenty-five years.
' For a relatively recent application of this traditional test to a challenge based on a
violation of equal protection, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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the finding of invidious discrimination and the invocation of the new test has
consistently operated to invalidate the state practice in dispute; thus far, no
state interest has been found sufficiently compelling."l Since this compelling
interest test is a judicial creature, the parameters of the classes of suspect criteria and fundamental rights sufficient to invoke the test have yet to be clearly
defined. It is clear, however, that the right to interstate travel is within the
accepted class of fundamental rights; likewise, it is also clear that discrimination based solely on the recent exercise of that right involves a suspect criterion.
II. VOTING
A. The Right to the Franchise
The federal constitution does not expressly confer the right to vote upon
any citizen of the United States.' Nevertheless, the right to vote in federal
elections is said to be implied by those constitutional provisions relating to the
election of federal officers and representatives." The right of suffrage in the
federal context is distinct from whatever similar right may exist with respect
to the election of state and local officers and representatives. 4 The federal
constitution makes no provision for the latter right. Hence, the power to extend or refuse the franchise on the state and local level is among those powers
reserved to the states." Furthermore, the states may impose certain limitations,
apart from the requirement of citizenship, upon the exercise of the right to
vote both in the state and in the federal context." Thus, while the right to
vote in federal elections cannot be altogether denied by the states, the states
may limit that right, as well as whatever right may exist to vote in the state
and local context, such that it may be lawfully exercised only by a given class
of citizens.' However, the constitutional right to vote in federal elections, and
"The only adequate interest found to date is that of national security. The imprisoning
of Japanese-Americans in camps during World War II was upheld in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the case in which, ironically, the new test began to take shape.
The cases and commentaries which have formulated the test are myriad. The best explication
of both the substantive and procedural interstices of the doctrine may be found in Mr.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969).
32 Neither does the Federal Constitution entitle one to vote by virtue of his citizenship
in one of the several states.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, calls for the election of members of the House of Representatives by the people of the several states. The seventeenth amendment similarly calls for
the election of United States Senators. Article II, § 1, deals with the somewhat more complicated procedure for electing the President and Vice President. The right to vote in federal
elections has also been held to be among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
It might further be asserted that this right is essential to the maintenance of a republican
form of government as guaranteed by art. IV, § 4. But cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162 (1875), a pre-nineteenth amendment case which held that women need
not be allowed to vote in order to find a republican form of government.
'4 If a right to vote per se exists in this context at all, it exists by virtue of the particular
state constitution.
"This power is reserved to the states in U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See also
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, which empowers the states to oversee the manner in which United
States Senators and Representatives are elected, subject to certain congressional regulations.
'" Nevertheless, the power of the states to regulate the franchise with respect to the
election of United States Senators and Representatives is expressly limited. While art. I,
§ 4, places authority over the time, place, and method of election in the hands of the several
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the right to vote in local elections, once extended, may not be limited by the
states in any manner which runs afoul of certain other constitutional limitations. That is, the federal constitution contains four specific"s and one general"9 limitation upon the power of the states to deny the franchise to certain
classes of citizens.
With reference to the specific prohibitions against imposing certain limitations upon the right of suffrage, the state of the law could hardly be clearer.
From the point of their ratification, those amendments which explicitly prohibit the limitation of the right to vote on account of certain traits or conditions have foreclosed the power of both the federal and state governments to
practice certain kinds of discrimination at the polls. With reference to the
more general limitations imposed by the fourteenth amendment, the extent of
the power of the states to classify is considerably more vague. If the guarantee
of due process of the law is defined along traditional lines, only those restrictions which are unreasonable," or which offend fundamental procedural safeguards,41 would be proscribed. The guarantee against abridgment of privileges
and immunities of national citizenship would seem to do little more than
bolster the proposition suggested by previously cited constitutional provisions,
i.e., that no state may interfere with a qualified citizen's right to vote in a
federal election.' Finally, if the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
drawn along traditional lines, only those state-imposed classifications not rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective would contravene the
fourteenth amendment." However, if the more stringent test of equal protection is applicable to those state laws or policies which deny the franchise
to an entire class of otherwise qualified citizens, then the limitations which
the fourteenth amendment impose upon the states' power to regulate voter
qualifications become substantial.
The stricter test of compliance with the equal protection clause has lately
been used to invalidate discriminatory attempts to condition the franchise. The
fall of the poll tax is an example. In 1937, the poll tax survived constitutional
states, this grant of power is not absolute, for Congress is empowered by that same provision
to alter such regulations. The authority of Congress over the ultimate regulation of the
election of representatives of national government was questioned, and, finally, sustained
in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). As for authority over the election of
national executive officers, art. II, S 1, also empowers the state to appoint electors in the
manner selected by state legislatures. Here, also, the power of the states has been held to
be implicitly limited by the inherent right of the Congress to protect the efficient operation
of national government. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). Thus,
Congress has final authority over the regulation of election to all federal offices.
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XV prohibits the denial of the franchise
in the federal, state, or
local context "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The nineteenth
amendment is a similar proscription applicable to denial of the franchise because of sex.
The twenty-fourth amendment prohibits conditioning the right to vote in federal elections
upon payment of any tax. The twenty-sixth amendment prevents the denial of the franchise
on the basis of age to any person over eighteen years of age.
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV contains a more general limitation upon classifications which
abridge the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, or which deny due process of
law or equal protection of the laws.
.' See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
41 See United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934).
42See note 33 supra, and accompanying text. Of course, insofar as the privileges and
immunities of United States citizens entail their right to interstate travel, the clause may
have a direct bearing upon the constitutionality of residence requirements.
4
See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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attack under the traditional test of equal protection." Some twenty-seven years
later, the ratification of the twenty-fourth amendment banned payment of the
taxes prerequisite to the exercise of the franchise in federal elections.' In
1966, the Court reversed its earlier stance and held that a classification which
denied the right to vote in state and local elections to those otherwise qualified voters who failed to pay a poll tax contravened the equal protection
clause." Although that holding appears to have been based in large part upon
a finding that the statute created a classification on the basis of wealth,47 the
substance of the right involved, i.e., voting, was given considerable attention
by the Court." Hence, while there seems to be no explicit basis for considering
the right to vote in state elections as fundamental per se, and while the Court
has not supplied an implicit constitutional basis for such a finding of fundamentality, subsequent cases support the conclusion that, at least for purposes
of claims grounded upon the equal protection clause, the state and local franchise must be extended indiscriminately as a matter of right in the absence of
a compelling state interest."
B. Voting and Residence Requirements
The history of the relationship between the right of suffrage and the imposition of residence requirements closely parallels the recent history of the
"Breedlove

v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
amend. XXIV.
"Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
41 Whether a classification which discriminates on the basis of wealth but places no burden upon the exercise of a fundamental right violates the guarantee of equal protection is
not clearly resolved. When classifications on the basis of wealth have received attention
in cases involving the rights of the criminally accused, the Court has placed considerable
reliance upon the tendency of such a classification to contravene procedural due process. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Likewise, in cases involving civil rights, the
special attention given by the Court to classifications on the basis of wealth has invariably
been coupled with the observation that basic substantive rights or questions of procedural
due process were inextricably involved. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966), with Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). When fundamental
rights are involved, the stricter test of equal protection is applicable even in the absence of
classification on the basis of some suspect criterion. Hence, the above cited cases could conceivably have been decided in the same way without reliance upon the undesirability of
classifications which engender economic discrimination.
48 Considerable reliance was placed upon the importance of that right as expounded in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
A comparable history exists with respect to the demise of literacy tests as an impediment
to the exercise of the franchise. In 1959 the Court's conclusion was that if the tests were
fairly and consistently applied, neither the equal protection clause nor the seventeenth
amendment prohibited their use in either federal or state elections. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). However, it was soon apparent that the
discrimination, which the Court found was not condemned by the Constitution, was not
beyond congressional sanction. During the same year that the poll tax was struck down in
Harper, § 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970), was put to
the constitutional test. Specifically at issue was the authority of Congress to employ § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment to invalidate state literacy test laws by way of the supremacy
clause. The Court's conclusion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), was that
since § 5 constituted an affirmative grant of congressional power, Congress might determine
that such a prohibition was necessary and proper to implement fully the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.
" See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). But cf. Montgomery Ind. School Dist. v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1971). Kramer and Montgomery are compared in Note, Property Ownership Versus the Right To Vote: A Question
of Equal Protection, 25 Sw. L.J. 633 (1971).
41 U.S. CONST.
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right to vote.5" With reference to the requirement of bona fide residence, as
opposed to constant residence throughout a given period of time, judicial
thought has been relatively consistent-a state may impose upon the exercise of the franchise the requirement of bona fide residence. 1 While the imposition of this requirement has apparently never been challenged in the
appellate courts, certainly judicial review under even the compelling interest
standard would not lead to invalidation of this limitation." Though compelling
governmental interests are rarities in the law of equal protection,' 3 the public
concern for "purity of the ballot" would apparently be afforded such dignity. 4
With reference to durational residence requirements, the law has undergone
a slow evolution, culminating in the invalidation of such requirements as
prerequisite to the exercise of the right to vote. Pope v. Williams5 appears to
be the first case in which the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a durational residence requirement which limited the right of
suffrage in state elections. Though the one-year requirement was attacked on
equal protection grounds, the Court's conclusion that the statutory requirement was rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective, i.e., insuring
that only persons with a stake in the outcome of the election would take part,
left the requirement undisturbed. Evidently, Pope constituted the last word
on the subject until the more stringent standard of equal protection was developed. That durational residence requirements might be imposed so as to
limit access to the polls in both federal and local elections continued to resound within case law, though mainly by way of dictum."
As the standard for review of classifications which inhibited the right to
vote changed, so the range of constitutionally permissible limitations on that
right tightened. Of course, classifications limiting the franchise which were
drawn along racial lines had long been prohibited." However, even following
the invalidation of durational residence requirements as prerequisite to place" With the increasing emphasis upon the fundamental nature of the right to vote has
come a tendency to review those classifications which limit that right with close judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), in which the Court unanimously invalidated a Maryland statute which precluded residents of federal enclaves from
voting due to their non-residence. One authority has speculated that this decision may raise
doubts concerning the constitutionality of the Texas statute granting jurisdiction for divorce
of servicemen who have lived in Texas for a year or more. See McKnight & Raggio, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 35 n.7 (1971).
"1Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965): "We stress-and this is a theme
to be reiterated-that Texas has the right to require that all military personnel enrolled to
vote be bona fide residents of the community."
"2An attack upon the constitutionality of a requirement of bona fide residence as precondition to exercise of the franchise would invoke the stricter test of equal protection, for
such a requirement would obviously limit the fundamental right to vote.
5See note 31 supra.
" "Purity of the ballot" and "colonization" are closely related terms. The latter term refers to crossing state lines to take part in a sister state's electoral process. The interest of a
state in thwarting colonization is obvious: the citizens of one state should not be allowed to
determine the outcome of the political processes of another state.
55 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
" See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
5
See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). Such classifications presently fall
within that distinct branch of the new equal protection which concerns itself with discrimination on the basis of some suspect criterion. The function of each branch of the doctrine
is well presented and thoroughly criticized in Mr. Justice Harlan's much quoted dissent in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
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ment on public welfare roles, there remained some uncertainty with respect to
whether the reasoning of Shapiro v. Thompson"6 might be extended so as to
invalidate similar requirements which limited the franchise. The analogies
suggested by Shapiro seemed speculative mainly because the Shapiro Court
explicitly limited the reach of that decision by way of a much-quoted'9 footnote which warned that the Court implied "no view of the validity of waiting
period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote . . . ."" Nevertheless, the commentators, having been convinced of the fundamental nature
of the right to the franchise per se and having been reminded of the potential
sweep of the freedom of interstate travel, thought the prohibition of durational
residence requirements limiting the franchise almost inevitable."1
The very recent history of judicial intervention with respect to voting and
equal protection of the laws may be traced to the reapportionment cases."
Their importance is twofold. They not only clarify the fundamental nature of
the right, at least for purposes of equal protection analysis," but also stand for
the proposition that a voter's place of residence within a state should have no
bearing upon his individual power at the polls. The reapportionment cases,
however, did not touch directly upon discrimination based upon length of
residence. In 1964, approximately one year after the reapportionment cases,
the Court considered a limitation upon the right of suffrage which was similar
to the familiar durational residence requirement. In Carrington v. Rash 4 a
serviceman stationed in Texas challenged a provision of the Texas Constitution which prohibited members of the military service who moved into the
state during the course of their military duty from voting in Texas elections
prior to discharge. The serviceman-petitioner's demonstration of his intent to
remain in Texas permanently was evidenced by a number of objective indicia.
Indeed, the fact of his bona fide intent to establish residence within the state
appears to have been uncontroverted. The Court, with Mr. Justice Stewart
writing the opinion, held that while Texas could undoubtedly condition extension of the franchise such that only bona fide residents would be permitted a
political voice, the restriction which absolutely barred military personnel who
were not residents prior to induction offended the guarantee of equal protec" 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"The Court's admonition that Shapiro should not be read to determine the invalidity
of other durational residence requirements was quite unnecessary in light of the fact that
no such question was then in issue. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that many of the later
decisions which have dealt with the potential unconstitutionality of durational residence
requirements only to conclude that such requirements were not invalid have relied to varying degrees on this admonition.
' 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. The Court went on to enumerate other existing requirements
which were considered to be unaffected by their decision: limitations with respect to admission to tuition-free public education, engagement in certain state-sanctioned occupations
(e.g., the practice of law), and permission to hunt or fish within a state.
"' The only problem encountered by legal prognosticators was one of deciding which
test to apply. Invariably these observers opted for the applicability of the stricter standard.
It followed that unless some compelling state interest could be mustered, durational residence requirements for voting were doomed to unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Comment,
Constitutional Law-Elections-Durational Residency Requirement, 23 S.C.L. REV. 320
(1971).
62
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
" "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society." 377 U.S. at 561-62.
"380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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tion. The state's interest in preventing a military takeover of state government,
while apparently a worthwhile goal, was found to be less than adequately
related to the constitutional provision in question.
Though the decision in Carrington seems sound in result, it is not easy to
discern what standard was operative in the case. The opinion speaks in terms
of the permissibility of classifications reasonably related to some purpose,
rather than the stricter test of equal protection. However, if the state's legislative goal was legitimate, was not the classification rationally related to that
end? "' Some attention is given to the zealous protection properly afforded the
right to vote,' but there is no significant support within the Court's language
for the application of any test beyond the traditional one. " The opinion seems
to give passing approval to another state constitutional provision which required residence for one year within the state and six months within the
county as a prerequisite to voting. Furthermore, besides the affirmation of the
state's interest in limiting the franchise to bona fide residents, the Court indicated that something beyond living within the state and a declared intention
to establish a residence might be necessary to ensure that the state's interest
was protected. " Only by "forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence" did the law in question violate the fourteenth amendment. " Hence, Carrington appears to have turned upon the absolute nature of
the limitation which the state imposed. Because certain otherwise qualified
persons were permanently barred from the polls, the Court passed upon the
validity of the restriction by looking beyond the rational basis upon which the
provision was based and evaluating the law in light of the "remote administrative benefit"'" which the law theoretically provided.
During the interim between Carrington and the cases challenging the
validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, the viability of durational residence requirements as a limitation on the right to vote remained,
but it did not go unquestioned. This brief period enveloped three significant
judicial events which shed light on the problem. Two of these, the decision in
Shapiro v. Thompson and the application of the stricter standard to other
limitations upon the right to vote, have already been given some attention.7
"' Mr. Justice Harlan seemed to encounter no difficulty in finding such a relationship.
"Such a policy on Texas' part may seem to many unduly provincial in light of modern conditions, but it cannot . . . be said to be unconstitutional." 380 U.S. at 101 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" "'The right . . . to choose,' . . . [is one) that this Court has been . . . zealous to
protect .... " 380 U.S. at 96.
67Although Mr. Justice Harlan registered a well-grounded dissent in Carrington, he
nevertheless found occasion to review that decision in his synopsis of the new equal protection in Shapiro. "[A)s I now see that case, the Court applied an abnormally severe equal
protection standard to a Texas statute denying certain servicemen the right to vote, without
indicating that the statutory distinction between servicemen and civilians was generally
'suspect.' " 394 U.S. at 660 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Of course, the Carrington Court was
more likely persuaded by the nature of the right involved than by the point of distinction
upon which the discriminatory law was constructed.
" For example, a further safeguard might be the imposition of durational residence requirements.
69380 U.S. at 96.
701d.

71With respect to the impact of Shapiro, see notes 1-6 supra, and accompanying text.
With respect to the application of the compelling interest test to other voting restrictions,
as well as the continuing recognition that the right to vote in even local elections is of the
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The third significant event involved indirect encounters by the Supreme Court
with the validity of durational residence requirements as a pre-condition to
voting.
Following Carrington,the next instance in point of time was a decision in
2
keeping with the holding in Pope. In Drueding v. DevlinW
a federal district
court sustained the application of a one-year durational residence requirement
which limited the right to vote, even in federal elections. The Drueding court
applied the rational basis standard and concluded that the requirement's
rational relationship to the legitimate legislative goal of insuring bona fide
residence adequately supported the validity of the statute."3 Among the voting
rights cases during the period under examination, Drueding deserves primary
attention, for almost immediately after the Court's decision in Carrington,the
decision of the district court in Drueding was affirmed per curiam and without
opinion by the Supreme Court.74 The case should, therefore, be regarded as
representative of the federal courts' position with respect to the validity of
durational residence requirements, at least until Shapiro. However, Drueding
was not to be the Court's last contact with residence limitations and the franchise. In 1969, a short time after Shapiro, a second case upholding durational
residence requirements as prerequisite to admission to the polls was put before
the final arbiters.' This time opinions were rendered but, unfortunately, the
majority did not reach the merits of the case. Because the petitioners had satisfied the residence requirement under attack, the issue had become moot, and,
accordingly, the lower court's judgment was vacated. However, Justices Brennan and Marshall were not persuaded that the procedural technicalities involved should be allowed to foreclose all opportunity for judicial review; they
proceeded to reach the merits." Pope, it was said, was no barrier to a finding
of presumptive unconstitutionality, as it had dealt with state elections only. At
any rate, the standard for review of classifications limiting the exercise of
fundamental rights had changed since Pope. For the dissenters, it followed that
the durational residence requirement constituted an impermissible limitation
on the exercise of the franchise. In light of the fact that the disposition of this
case followed Shapiro, it is conceivable that the question of the validity of
voting and durational residence requirements might have been settled as early
as 1969 had the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court been invoked a few months
earlier.
With but one exception," the Supreme Court did not again consider durational residence requirements and voting until the authority of Congress to
highest constitutional dignity, see note 50 supra, and accompanying text. See also Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), which invalidated a Louisiana law limiting the
right to vote in municipal bond elections to property taxpayers. The somewhat unique case
of the demise of literacy tests in state and local elections is traced in note 48 supra.
72234
F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964).
"8Other legitimate state concerns cited by the court included that of insuring that each
voter had a stake in the outcome of the election and that of limiting the franchise to an
informed electorate.
74
Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
7"Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), judgment vacated per curiam, 396
U.S. 45 (1969).

7'396 U.S. at 51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

"The Court did invalidate a Maryland law not altogether unlike the restriction which
was struck down in Carrington. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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deal with the question was tested. The intervening period did, however, produce a significant number of lower court cases which dealt with the validity
of such requirements. The results in those cases were not altogether onesided, but the weight of authority was that durational residence requirements
which restricted the franchise were violative of the equal protection guarantee.
One representative case in the federal courts examined such a restriction in
light of its tendency to restrict the exercise of the fundamental rights of voting
and interstate travel. Finding no compelling state interest to support the imposition of this restriction, the court concluded that the statute ran afoul of
the fourteenth amendment." The contrary point of view is represented by the
opinion of an Arizona federal district court. The basis for applying the traditional test of equal protection to a state durational residence requirement was
simple adherence to precedent: At the Supreme Court level the compelling
interest standard had been applied with respect to voter qualifications only in
cases involving something other than durational residence requirements. Hence,
at least with reference to state and local elections, Drueding was still good
law." Of course, the point of view which subscribes to the application of a
reasonableness test fails to take into account the Court's earlier conclusion that
for purposes of equal protection of the laws, the right to vote even in school
district elections is fundamental in character. Nevertheless, there existed some
division at the district court level with respect to what standard of review was
appropriate in testing the validity of durational residence requirements which
inhibit the exercise of the franchise.
In Oregon v. Mitchelr the Supreme Court considered the challenges of
four states to the validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.91
Among those provisions under attack was a prohibition against the states
which forbade the disqualification of voters in presidential and vice presidential elections for failure to meet durational residence requirements which conflicted with the national rules governing residence as set by Congress." Because the opinion deals with two other provisions of the federal law under
attack and because the various members of the Court were divided in a variety
3
of ways not seen since the decision in United States v. Guest,"
Oregon v.
Mitchell is a judicial crazy-quilt. However, the announcement of the judgments by Mr. Justice Black reveals that the provision abolishing state durational residence requirements with respect to presidential elections 4 was upheld
"Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970); accord, Bufford v. Holton,
319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970). At least one state court followed similar reasoning in
concluding that durational residence requirements were an unnecessary impediment to voting. See Keane v. Mihaly, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1970). See also
Castro
v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
' 5 Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970), vacated and remanded,
405 U.S. 1036 (1972).
80400 U.S. 112 (1970). The case was heard on bill of complaint along with Texas
v. Mitchell, United States v. Idaho, and United States v. Arizona.
9142 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-74 (1970).
" In United States v. Idaho, see note 80 supra, the federal government invoked the
original jurisdiction of the Court by requesting an injunction against the state of Idaho to
prohibit the state from enforcing durational residence requirements in presidential elections
to the extent that those requirements conflicted with the Voting Rights Act.
83383 U.S. 745 (1966).
"The remaining consolidated cases dealt with the validity of the Act's eighteen-year-old
voting and literacy test ban provisions.
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by an eight-to-one margin, though for a variety of reasons.' Mr. Justice Black
was of the opinion that previously discussed constitutional provisions!' and the
inherent power of a supreme national government to regulate its own affairs
(e.g., federal elections) together provided a sufficiently broad basis to support
the act of Congress in question." Following the senior Associate Justice's special opinion, Justices Stewart and Blackmun and the Chief Justice concurred,
but relied upon congressional power to legislate in implementation of the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of the various privileges of national citizenship, among which is the freedom of interstate movement." For the same
reason, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall also agreed that the abolition
of durational residence requirements for purposes of electing presidential
electors was within the limits of congressional authority." Only Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented from a finding of constitutionality with respect to the congressional abolition of state residence requirements in presidential elections. "
With the validation of that portion of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970 which forbade the states from disqualifying voters in presidential
elections because of their failure to meet state durational residence requirements," the Court's earlier decision in Pope v. Williams was not disturbed,
since Pope dealt only with residence requirements in state elections. However,
Oregon v. Mitchell did uphold that portion of the Act which invalidated state
durational residence requirements in presidential elections. This holding implicitly overruled Drueding as that case applied to presidential elections. The
only question which remained was whether the Court would continue to
countenance the application of state durational residence requirements in
state and local elections."2 A related problem was one of determining whether
there existed any congressional power to extend the 1970 amendments so as
to preclude the application of such requirements in a non-federal context."3
" Congress additionally set uniform law for absentee voting in such elections.
"See note 37 supra.
87400 U.S. at 124 n.7 (special opinion of Black, J.).
"Id. at 281-87 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Particular reliance was placed upon United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), as authority for a
finding of broad congressional power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The recognition of the right to interstate travel was based upon the previously discussed dictum in
the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See notes 22-24 supra, and
accompanying text.
"400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id. at 152 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Indeed, the only amendment which did not pass constitutional muster was one which
lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 years in both state and federal elections. It was
thought that Congress was without power to determine the minimum age requirement for
voting in non-federal elections. The question of congressional authority to force the lower
voting age upon the states for purposes of state and local elections has now been rendered
moot by the ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment. The ratification process was completed on July 5, 1971. The amendment provides that: "[T)he right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, S 1.
" Expressed another way, would Pope survive constitutional attack in light of the rise
of the new equal protection?
"aIn view of the lack of success with respect to congressional attempts to lower the
voting age in all elections, the power of Congress to prohibit durational residence requirements in all elections may have seemed doubtful prior to Blumstein. The two situations
are clearly distinguishable, however. Line drawing in terms of voting age requirements must
necessarily be somewhat arbitrary, but the establishment of some minimum age may be
regarded as necessary. On the other hand, the setting of durational residence requirements
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Whether the imposition of durational residence requirements, like the eighteenyear-old vote controversy, would lead to a twenty-seventh amendment was not
to be resolved until 1972.
C. Dunn v Blumstein
In June 1970, James Blumstein moved to Tennessee to accept an assistant
professorship at Vanderbilt University School of Law. The following month
he attempted to register to vote in the primary and general elections to be held
in that state during August and November of that year. Because he had not
been a Tennessee resident for one year, nor a resident of the county in which
he lived for three months, Blumstein was not allowed to register." He then
appealed to the county election commission and requested that the Tennessee
durational residence requirement be construed so as to allow him to rebut the
presumption of incompetence which the provision created by demonstrating
his ability to exercise the franchise intelligently. The commission unanimously
concluded that failure to meet the durational residence requirement constituted an absolute bar to the exercise of the franchise. Having thereby exhausted his administrative remedies, Blumstein instituted a class action in the
federal district court to challenge the validity of the restriction. Although his
request for a preliminary injunction was denied, the three-judge court held
that both the one-year and the three-month requirements were unconstitutional
in that they denied to otherwise qualified new residents the equal protection of
the laws. " The subsequent November general elections were held in compliance with the court's order and, presumably, Professor Blumstein was allowed to vote." The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court which held that the imposition of a requirement that a resident must
have lived in the state for one year and in the county of registration for three
is invariably arbitrary, and, assuming that all voters are bona fide residents, no reason
exists to impose such requirements. Furthermore, though both kinds of restrictions touch
the exercise of voting, a fundamental right, only durational residence requirements affect
the right to interstate travel.
"4The durational residence requirements which were applied to exclude Professor Blumstein from the polls are found in TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which provides that twentyone-year-old United States citizens who reside within the state for 12 months and within
the county for 3 months prior to the day of the election shall be entitled to vote in the
election of President and Vice President of the United States, members of the Tennessee
General Assembly, and other civil officers for the county or district in which the voter resides. The provision then empowers the state legislature to enact laws to preserve the "purity
of the ballot box."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1971), recites the same qualifications with respect to
voting in the election of state legislators and various local officials.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-304 (1971), applies the previously enumerated qualifications
to the registration procedure. It further provides that registration shall not be allowed within
30 days of any primary or general election.
Of course, those features of Tennessee law which apply the durational residence restriction to voting in the election of President and Vice President of the United States were
pre-empted by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 332-33 (1972). The preliminary injunction was
denied because the district court concluded that its issuance might disrupt the impending
primary election.
" The facts recited in the text are drawn substantially from the Brief of the Appellee
at 2-4, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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months as a precondition to the exercise of the franchise violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
It has been previously noted that the Court has treated the right to travel
from state to state" and, more recently, the right to vote in state elections"
as fundamental, at least for purposes of the application of the equal protection
clause. It follows that a state statute, or any official posture, which limits the
exercise of either or both of those rights is unconstitutional to the extent that
it is not justified by a compelling state interest. No great amount of legal
reasoning is necessary to conclude that durational residence requirements
which restrict the franchise are presumptively violative of the guarantee of
equal protection. Furthermore, the assumption that no compelling state interest will support a one-year durational residence requirement for purposes
of voting easily supports a conclusive finding of constitutional invalidity. However, a more detailed examination of the Supreme Court's treatment of Dunn
v. Blumstein does suggest some formidable questions.
The Court made clear from the outset that the provision under attack was
not one which required merely bona fide residence. Presumably, even if it were
contended that the requirement of bona fide residence within a given political
subdivision severely limited the franchise, which it concededly does, this requirement would be supported by the state's overriding interest in preventing
colonization. The opinion in Blumstein appears to regard the validity of this
presumption as a foregone conclusion."
The Court then looked to Williams v, Rhodes"' as a guide for review of
the validity of laws challenged on equal protection grounds. That is, the Court
determined "the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted
in support of the classification.""' Analysis of the classification in light of the
first two features of this guide determined the standard to be applied. Since
the individual interests affected were those of voting and interstate travel, the
appropriate standard was the now familiar act to determine the necessity of
imposing the classification in furtherance of a compelling state interest. This
test was then applied with respect to the third feature of the Williams guide,
an examination of the governmental interests at stake.
Prior to its inquiry into the nature of the state's interest, the Court briefly
dealt with that precedent which, at first glance, stood in the way of any finding
of invalidity with respect to durational residence requirements as a prerequisite
to voting. Naturally, Tennessee relied heavily upon the Court's affirmance
without opinion of the decision in Drueding v. Devlin."' The Court's response
was essentially an observation that legal circumstances had changed since that
U.S. at 360.
"See notes 17-31 supra, and accompanying text.
"See notes 80-90 supra, and accompanying text.
" It is submitted that the Court's position in this regard is beyond dispute; the whole
system of effective representative democracy, which the reapportionment cases sought to
protect, would be undermined should dual voting become common practice. See note 62
supra, and accompanying text.
101393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
102405 U.S. at 335.
"' The case is discussed in the text accompanying note 72 supra.
'"405
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decision. "[It is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for
any statute that 'place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to vote.' ""0
Indeed, a line of decisions' ° applying that stricter test during the years intervening between Drueding and Blumstein could hardly be ignored in favor of
adhering to the reasoning of a case which was decided without the benefit of
argument. As for the question of the continuing validity of Pope v. Williams,"'
that case was distinguished on the ground that it merely approved the power
of the state to require a showing of bona fide residence as a prerequisite to
voting." ' Any dicta in Pope concerning the authority of the state to go beyond
the requirement of bona fide residence was considered to be no longer viable.
Though the Court did not undertake to distinguish Hall v. Beales,"' that case
posed no barrier to the ultimate decision in Blumstein, for in Hall the Court
never reached the merits, but, instead, dismissed the case on procedural grounds.
The Court then proceeded to measure the substance of the state's asserted
interest in imposing the requirement. The first cited interest was the familiar
one of preserving the purity of the ballot, i.e., the prevention of colonization
or dual voting. As mentioned earlier, the interest of a state in ensuring that
only residents elect public officials must necessarily be considered essential to
the efficient operation of both the state and federal systems."' The shortcoming
of the state's argument for validity was the lack of proximity between the
concededly compelling interest and the classification itself. From one point of
view, the imposition of a durational residence requirement indiscriminately
swept recently-arrived bona fide residents into the same class with "colonizers,"
and hence, the overbreadth of the law placed an absolute bar on the innocent
newcomer's exercise of a fundamental right. From another point of view the
existence of even a rational relationship between the fact of residence for less
than one year and any disposition to perpetuate a voting fraud was doubtful
in light of Tennessee's practice of accepting a potential registrant's oath with
respect to his qualification to vote as sufficient evidence to allow the affiant to
register. In any case, if the state had chosen to protect its interest with greater
vigor by investigating the fact of bona fide residence in each instance of
registration, the imposition of the one-year waiting period would certainly
have added nothing to the assurance of lack of fraud, assurance which could
be had only by individual investigation of each registrant. Finally, the state's
assertion that the imposition of the requirement was justified for the sake of
administrative convenience was vulnerable to the argument that the fact of
bona fide residence could be determined in another, if not also a better, way.
Indeed, Tennessee had provided that registration cease thirty days immediately
100405 U.S. at 337, quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), which held the
imposition of excessive filing fees for placement on the ballot to be violative of the equal
protection clause.
" See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
100See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
107405 U.S. at 337 n.7. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Marshall had earlier
circumvented the holding in Pope by concluding that the decision could not be construed
to approve the application of durational residence requirements to voting in presidential
elections. Hall v. Beales, 396 U.S. 45, 53 n.1 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101396 U.S. 45 (1971). Hall is discussed in the text accompanying note 75 supra.
"'0See note 100 supra.
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prior to election for the sake of compiling voter lists"' (thereby providing a
sufficient period for insuring purity of the ballot) and, more importantly, had
prescribed a test of bona fide residence elsewhere."' Thus, while the state asserted an apparently compelling state interest, the classification in question
was simply not necessary to promote that interest.112
The second interest asserted by the state was that of ensuring that only
"knowledgeable voters" would exercise the franchise. Of course, if the goal of
the requirement was to guarantee a oneness of political disposition or a consistently provincial outlook, this constituted an impermissible state goal.' If,
on the other hand, the state's goal was one of insuring a general familiarity
with local issues and an understanding of the points of view of candidates and
incumbent public officials on the state and local level, this suggested the degree
to which a state may deny to the voter who is ignorant of these facts a voice
in his government. Putting aside that question, the Court concluded that, in
any case, the tenuous relationship between residence for one year and the
knowledgeability of the voter could not sustain the imposition of such a
limitation on the franchise. The imposition of a requirement which treaded
upon fundamental rights was simply not necessary to achieve such a goal.
In view of the inability of the state to demonstrate the necessity of imposing
a durational residence requirement in furtherance of at least one admittedly
compelling state interest, that of insuring purity of the ballot, the limitation
on the franchise was held to contravene the fourteenth amendment. After
Dunn v. Blumstein, the applicability of the reasoning in Shapiro to durational
residence requirements which bar newcomers from the polls can no longer be
doubted." 4
"' See note 94 suplra.
..As is apparently the custom in most jurisdictions, Tennessee defines residence in terms
of domicile: a present intention to stay indefinitely in one place. Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn.
178, 42 S.W.2d 210 (1931).
12 "[I]t is impossible to view durational residence requirements as necessary to achieve
that state interest [of stopping fraud)." 405 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
"' Such a concession on the part of the state placed the classification directly within the
proscription of Carrington v. Rash. See note 64 supra, and accompanying text.
114The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger drew an analogy to the limiting of
the right to vote to persons 18 years of age and older. He dismissed the challenge to durational residence requirements by stating: "In both cases some informed and responsible
persons are denied the vote, while others less informed and less responsible are permitted
to vote." 405 U.S. at 363 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In essence, this argument is that since
persons under age are denied the vote, there is no reason to allow new residents of a state
to vote simply because of the protected right to interstate travel. This approach fails first
because of the recently adopted twenty-sixth amendment which forbids denial of the right
to vote to persons over 18 on account of age. The provision took the form of a constitutional amendment in order to avoid the problem of drawing lines by the courts, the problem
with which the Chief Justice is so concerned. Denial of the vote to persons under 18 is
no longer an equal protection question; it is now part of the Constitution. Secondly, even
assuming that the twenty-sixth amendment had never been passed, it is certainly a unique
approach in the history of equal protection to argue that some discrimination justifies all
discrimination. Thirdly, discrimination based on recent exercise of the right to travel interstate is, under Shapiro, a violation of equal protection per se. The denial of the right to
vote is only the particular form of discrimination involved in this durational residence requirement. Unless one wishes to assert that the "right" to receive welfare is fundamental
for purposes of equal protection, it is clear that the penalty placed on the exercise of the
right to interstate travel does not also have to abridge a fundamental right. In contrast to
the usual attitude of the Chief Justice to prior decisions of the Court (e.g., Pope v. Williams), it is apparent that he may doubt the continuing validity of the decision in Shapiro.
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Voter Fraudand the RegistrationPeriod. The basis of the opinion in Blumstein
is that a state may effectively insulate itself from voter fraud without relying
upon the blunderbuss of durational residence requirements-limitations which
restrict the right of travel and, in this instance, the right to vote as well. Those
avenues open to the state to thwart attempts to cross state lines to invade the
polls are numerous. Apart from the administration of an oath of bona fide residence as prerequisite to registration, investigation of each resident to discover
other indicia of bona fide residence, the imposition of criminal penalties for
colonization, and the cross-checking of lists of new registrants with their
former place of residence, the state could simply require the surrender of
voter registration certificates issued by former jurisdictions in which the registrant resided as prerequisite to admission to the polls. It is important to note
that Blumstein does not foreclose the requirement of registration nor the imposition of a cutoff point for registration so that the state will be afforded a
chance to employ any one, or even all of the previously enumerated methods
of protecting the purity of the ballot. Indeed, this feature of the case poses the
most formidable question suggested by the majority opinion.
Does not the imposition of a cutoff period prior to the election penalize
interstate movement within that period and bar the exercise of a fundamental
right with respect to persons who enter a new state as bona fide residents during
that period? Without regard to the term chosen as a waiting period, does not
the requirement of residence within a state for even a comparatively short
time contravene the equal protection clause? Blumstein would seem to indicate otherwise, for the imposition of a thirty-day cutoff with respect to registration of voters was not set aside by the Court.1"' Yet, if the imposition of a
one-year durational residence requirement has barred an estimated five million
otherwise qualified voters from the polls,116 does it not follow, assuming a constant flow of persons in interstate travel, that the imposition of what is, in
effect, a thirty-day residence requirement would preclude an estimated fourhundred thousand otherwise qualified voters from exercising the franchise
following their recent displacement into another state? At least two related
arguments may be advanced to support the position that a thirty-day registration cutoff does not offend the concept of equal protection of the laws.
One argument is that the closing of registration a month prior to election
does not discriminate on the basis of recent arrival within a state because the
closing of registration would apply indiscriminately to both newcomers and
to long-time residents who, for unimportant reasons, fail to register prior to
thirty days before an election. 1 7 The obvious fallacy in this argument is that
"' "It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for
the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud-and a
year, or three months, too much." 405 U.S. at 348.
.1.
Comment, supra note 61, at 331.
11 This argument is suggested by the Court's analogy to the "different constitutional
question . . . presented" by a situation in which "an interstate migrant loses his driver's
license
because the new State has a higher age requirement" than the old. 405 U.S. at 342
2
n.1 . But cannot the driver's license case be distinguished from the voter registration case?
In the former, all persons below the age requirement, both newcomers and old residents,
are completely foreclosed from exercising a given privilege, while in the latter case, old
residents have at least an opportunity to fulfill any requirement prerequisite to the exercise
of the franchise.
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newcomers are completely foreclosed from the exercise of the franchise whereas residents for more than thirty days have had at least an opportunity to
register to vote. Furthermore, even assuming that the right of interstate travel
is not penalized, the fundamental right to vote is itself restricted such that the
thirty-day requirement might be regarded as presumptively unconstitutional.
A less vulnerable argument in defense of the closing of registration prior
to election is that since the state has an admittedly compelling state interest
in ensuring that only bona fide residents vote, the state must be given an opportunity to do that which is necessary to check voting fraud, e.g., compile and
cross-check voting lists. Thirty days should provide a reasonable opportunity
to investigate fraudulent registration and, therefore, the thirty-day buffer is
itself necessary to promote the state's overriding interest in purity of the ballot.
Furthermore, it is useless to speculate with regard to whether thirty-one-day
or thirty-five-day requirements might be vulnerable to constitutional attack,
for the period of time available to the state is a question of fact which may
vary, though not considerably, from state to state. In this sense, then, registration cutoffs become analogous to age requirements in that some line, even
though somewhat arbitrary," 8 must be drawn in order to promote a compelling
governmental interest. So long as the line drawn speaks well of legislative
attempts to compromise individual freedoms with administrative necessities
this new "reasonable/compelling interest test" is satisfied. Naturally, as technological advance speeds up administrative procedure, the range of permissible
limitation will tighten.
The upshot of the Court's reasoning with regard to durational residence
requirements and voting is that while a one-year requirement is impermissible
because its imposition is not necessary to further the admitted compelling interest in purity of the ballot, a thirty-day period in which to check voter fraud
is necessary and, therefore, may override the individual interests in interstate
travel and, more importantly, the freedom to exercise the franchise. Perhaps
subsequent cases will lead to further application of the reasonable/compelling
interest principle which the Court appears to apply. Nevertheless, Blumstein
does indicate that durational residence requirements may be vulnerable in any
number of other cases in which they are properly viewed as penalties which
restrict the right to travel across state lines. When this fact is recognized, at
least a presumpion of invalidity must follow.
III.

DIVORCE

So loose, indeed, and so confusing, is our State marriage and divorce legislation
becoming, that it might be well to ask whether the cause of morality would
not be promoted if, by constitutional amendment, the whole subject were
placed in control of the general government; so that, at least, one uniform
system could be applied .... ."
.. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
"9 J. SCHOULER,

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,

SEPARATION

AND

DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1464, at 1721 (6th ed. 1921). "Citizens of this Union, traveling
readily from one State to another, find facilities for divorce and re-marriage always at hand;
for sham divorce and sham re-marriage, perhaps, but for divorce and re-marriage sufficient
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In the more than eighty years since this passage was written, concern with
the morality of divorce has decreased, but the problems inherent in the control
of marital status by more than fifty separate jurisdictions have become even
more complicated. This increase in confusion may be attributed primarily to
two factors. There is now virtually no social stigma attached to divorce per se,
and this society is much more mobile than that of three-quarters of a century
ago. As a result of the increasing amount of interstate divorce litigation, traditional theory has suffered exhaustive examination and modification in order
to satisfy the due process" 1 and full faith and credit 12 clauses of the Constitution. A thorough analysis of these constitutional provisions as they relate to
divorce is beyond the scope of this Comment,"3 but an outline of the current
state of the law should be helpful as framework for later discussion.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "judicial power to grant a divorcejurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile."1 " Domicile is usually
defined as residence supported by physical presence and no intention to acquire
another.1" For most purposes, a divorce action is treated as one in rem because
of the fictional marital res, and jurisdiction over the res can be obtained only
by obtaining jurisdiction over at least one spouse.' Since a state has an interest
in the marital status of those living within the state," 7 the requirement of
to keep guilty parties in countenance, and perplex the tribunals which must apply the law."
Id.
120 The opinion first appeared in an edition more than thirty years earlier. Id. at n.39.
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
.2 Id. art. IV, S 1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), which provides that the acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of any state are entitled to the same "full faith and credit"
in the courts of any other state as they would have in the courts of the rendering state.
123For an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of domicile as the basis for divorce
jurisdiction, see Note, Domicile as a Constitutional Requirement for Divorce Jurisdiction,
44 IOWA L. REV. 765 (1959). In general, a decree of divorce is entitled to full faith and
credit (at least as to marital status) if the rendering state was the domicile of one of the
parties; due process is satisfied if at least one spouse is domiciled in the rendering state;
and the finding of domicile in an ex parte proceeding may be attacked by a non-consenting
spouse as well as by another state having some justifiable interest in the marriage relationship. Id. at 776.
14Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (Williams II), citing Bell
v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901), and Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). The Court,
however, has never held that domicile is the only constitutional basis of divorce jurisdiction.
But see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911, dismissed
as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). At least two courts have held that domicile is not required.
See Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958), noted in 12 VAND. L. REV.
924 (1959)
(mere residence, i.e., inhabitance, sufficient under state statute); DavidZieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (jurisdiction because ceremony was in New York).
l See notes 9-11 supra, and accompanying text.
120"The place of residence of the parties determines the jurisdiction of the court. If the
parties live in different states each state has jurisdiction over the rest [sic) and each state
may dissolve the relation as far as the party within its jurisdiction is concerned." F. KEEZER,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 314-15 (2d ed. 1923) (citing cases).
See also H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLEs, HANDEOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127

(4th ed. 1964); Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165 (1943). Regulation of marital status has been regarded as one of the powers reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I).
.. In Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I), the Court
stated :
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital
status of persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage relation creates
problems of large social importance. Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of the
commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with which the state
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domicile as the basis for divorce jurisdiction has developed.'
The question with which we are concerned involves the determination of the
requisite domicile."2 ' Virtually all of the states employ a durational residency
requirement,"' which each particular legislature has determined to be the
length of residency required to show that a person is, for purposes of divorce,
probably a bona fide resident of that state.'"' This durational residency requirement serves the same purpose as one for voting or state college tuition. Persons
living in the state for less than the statutory period face an irrebuttable presumption that they are not bona fide residents, regardless of actual status.'
Whether residency requirements for divorce are regarded as jurisdictional or
merely as an irrebuttable presumption, the fact is that they operate to deny
access to the courts to persons who may be bona fide residents (and, therefore,
domiciled in the jurisdiction) but have not lived in the jurisdiction for the
statutory period.
The constitutionality of durational residence requirements has been challenged in two recent cases. In Wymelenberg v. Syman 33 a three-judge federal
court invalidated a Wisconsin statute which provided that before a divorce
action could be commenced one of the parties had to be a "bona fide resident
'.The court relied on Shapiro v. Thompof this state for at least 2 years . ..""'
son.3 and Boddie v. Connecticut..' in declaring the durational residence remust deal. Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command over its
domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter
within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even
though the other spouse is absent.
Id. at 298-99.
128
See note 123 supra, and accompanying text.
12'Apparently, Hawaii and Arkansas are the only two states which do not require that
at least one of the parties to a divorce reside in the state. See notes 124 supra, 147 infra.
Although the lack of requirement of domicile may lead to problems of full faith and credit and due process (see note 123 supra), such a policy is within the power of the states.
It may be that the burden placed on the exercise of the right to interstate travel by the requirement of domicile per se is constitutionally impermissible. See notes 12-31 supra, and
accompanying text.
"See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. S 1272 (Supp.
1971); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.21 (1971).
"'. As the ecclesiastical courts which, in England, originally had jurisdiction of
divorce cases, were never established in this country, the only jurisdiction
which any court in this country has is founded upon special statutory and
constitutional provisions. Such jurisdiction is not inferred from statutes giving
general jurisdiction in civil matters.
F. KEEZER, supra note 126, at 312 (citing cases).
In Ruge v. Ruge, 95 Wash. 51, 165 P. 1063 (1917), the court stated:
While inherently the matter of granting a divorce involves the judicial process, historically and theoretically the power to grant a divorce a vinculo is
purely legislative. Consequently, there is no inherent jurisdiction in the
common-law courts to grant a divorce absolutely severing and canceling the
marital bonds; but they have only such power with respect to granting absolute divorces as the legislative department in the particular jurisdiction sees
fit to expressly confer upon them, or such as are necessarily implied from
those expressly given them.
165 P. at 1064-65.
.3.
See notes 144-47 infra, and accompanying text. But cf. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667
(3d Cit. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911, dismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
13328
F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
I-'WIs. STAT. § 247.05(3) (Supp. 1971).
'3 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
13"401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie the Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibited a state from denying an indigent access to its courts to
seek divorce solely because he was unable to pay the court costs. See note 139 infra.
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quirement unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses,
respectively, of the fourteenth amendment. The court found that "Wisconsin
by legislation has granted access to its divorce courts to 'bona fide residents'
who have lived in the state for at least two years but has denied similar access
to 'bona fide residents' . . . who have not yet lived in the state for that length
of time."1"7 As a result, the court held that the statute violated due process
because, under Boddie, a state may not "pre-empt the right to dissolve the
marriage relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so""' in the absence of "a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance . . . . "' The statute was also held to violate the equal
protection clause because "a substantial number of Wisconsin residents who
possess grounds for divorce ... remain barred from the courts simply 'because
they have recently moved into the jurisdiction.' ""'
The state asserted four interests which could justify the two-year residence
requirement. The first was to deter those with marital problems from entering
the state, a purpose which the court immediately dismissed as impermissible
under Shapiro.4' The second was to maintain marital stability, but the court,
again citing Shapiro, regarded this theory as irrational in that residents of the
state for more than two years could get a divorce even if they had been married
but a day, while new residents who might have been married fifty years could
not.142 The state's third alleged interest was to assure that at least one of the
parties was domiciled in the jurisdiction. This contention was unacceptable
under Shapiro because " '[ffar less drastic means' of determining domicile are
available"'43 than what would amount to an irrebuttable evidentiary presumption. The last asserted state interest was to protect the state's reputation by
avoiding a "divorce mill" image. In response, the court emphasized that Wisconsin would not be precluded from a determination of domicile before taking
jurisdiction, but only that a durational residence requirement could not be
conclusive on that issue.1" Thus, the state was held to have no interest sufficient to satisfy either the compelling interest standard of the equal protection
test or the overriding significance test set out in Boddie. Perhaps the most
significant aspect of this decision is that the court interpreted Boddie to stand
for the proposition that access to courts is a fundamental right for purposes of
either equal protection or due process."
137328 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
401 U.S. at 383.
13Ild. at 377. The Court held that the state had no interest which would justify deprivation of access to the courts: "due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because
of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages." Id. at 374.
' 328 F. Supp. at 1355, citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. The court gave alternate
grounds for a violation of equal protection:
In the instant case, alternatively, the fundamental right of 'access to the divorce court,' Boddie, supra, is being penalized by a two year bar upon new
residents, or the fundamental right to 'travel,' Shapiro, supra, is being penalized by the denial to new residents of access to the divorce courts.
Id. at41 1356 n.6.
1

1 42

1

43

1d. at 1355.

Id.
Id.

'" Id. at 1355-56.
"" See notes 134-40 supra, and accompanying text. This characterization of access to
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The decision in Whitehead v. Whitehead1 was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii with the decisions in Shapiro, Boddie, and Wymelenberg before it; nevertheless, the court managed to uphold Hawaii's durational residence
requirement ' by either dismissing or distinguishing those cases. The court
stated that the residence requirement was reasonable for purposes of the traditional equal protection because of "the possibility of perjury if the finding
on that issue [domicile) is made dependent upon the testimony of an interested
party."14 ' The court then proceeded to assert that since the exclusion of persons
contemplating divorce was not the specific purpose of the statute, and "the
[residence] requirement [does not operate] in any appreciable number of cases
to deter persons from moving into other states to establish their homes,"149
the statute also survived Shapiro.1"
In avoiding Boddie and Wymelenberg, the court was a bit more inventive,
distinguishing those cases on the basis that the Hawaii statute is a substantive
provision which must be satisfied before a divorce may be granted, whereas
the costs in Boddie and the residence requirement in Wymelenberg dealt
merely with access to and jurisdiction of courts.1 ' The theory behind this distinction is that the Hawaii requirement only prevents the court from granting
a decree, not from hearing a case.1 ' Thus, residents for less than one year are
not denied access to state courts; they merely cannot obtain any relief. Of
course, the Supreme Court of Hawaii is entitled to interpret state law as it
sees fit, and its determination that the one-year residence required for the
granting of a divorce is substantive is its concern only.1 However, the court
courts as fundamental for purposes of equal protection would, of course, invoke the compelling interest test were that right abridged, and the repercussions of that application would
certainly exceed what the court probably considered in making the interpretation.
'492 P.2d 939 (Hawaii 1972).
147 HAWAI
REv. STAT. S 580-1 (1968) provides that "[no absolute divorce from the
bond of matrimony shall be granted for any cause unless either party to the marriage has
been domiciled or has been physically present in the State for a continuous period of at
least one year .... See note 152 infra.
148 492 P.2d at 943. This reasoning is inconsistent with the sufficiency of mere physical
presence. See note 147 supra.
149492 P.2d at 945.
The court stated that "the probability of residential requirement for divorce operating
to deter the exercise of the right of interstate travel is too remote to render it invalid." Id.
at 945. This justification was made on the authority of a passage from Williams v. Fears,
179 U.S. 270 (1900), in which it was stated that freedom of egress from Georgia would
be only incidentally and remotely affected by a certain tax. Id. at 274. How the Hawaii
Supreme Court could seriously ignore almost three-quarters of a century of development
in constitutional law is incomprehensible. Shapiro at least made clear that discrimination
which even indirectly penalizes the right to interstate travel cannot be sustained by an allegation that the scope of the discrimination is so restricted that it is reasonable. See notes
1-3 supra, and accompanying text.
11' 492 P.2d at 947 n.6.
"'zThe first sentence of S 580-1 provides for exclusive original jurisdiction in the family
court of the state circuit "in which the applicant has been domiciled or has been physically
present for . . . at least three months ...." This residence requirement was not in issue,
but the court treated it as the one dealing with access to the courts.
"'5The effect of this characterization of the residence requirement, which operates in
terms of domicile or mere physical presence, is to make residency a necessary element of
the cause of action for divorce rather than a means for determining jurisdiction of the
court. Any assertion that such a requirement serves the purpose of determining domicile
is unsupportable because physical presence alone is sufficient under the statute. As a result, even those who admittedly are not domiciled within the state may obtain a divorce
after satisfying the requirement, and the only persons who may not are those who have not
satisfied the requirement, be they bona fide residents or transients. Thus, if the legislature
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has completely missed the point of Boddie-that due process requires access
to the courts for all citizens in order to obtain the relief which the state has
determined only its courts can give."' If a decree cannot be granted, the relief
sought by plaintiffs in divorce suits is no more obtainable that if the court
cannot hear the suit initially. The violation of due process in Boddie was the
deprivation of the only means of obtaining relief, which in that case was at
the level of access to the courts; the assertion that somehow due process is not
violated when such deprivation consists of the denial of a decree instead of the
initial denial of access to the courts is a hollow one.
The Wymelenberg opinon appears to be the better case in terms of its
recognition of the thrust of cases such as Shapiro and Boddie-if the effect of
a state policy is to deprive any of its citizens of either equal protection or due
process, such a policy is constitutionally permissible only if the state has a
compelling or overriding interest in retaining that particular policy. The holding in Wymelenberg gains additional strength because the Supreme Court, in
Blumstein, made clear that it meant what it said in Shapiro. If the recognized
state interest in assuring the integrity of its elections is insufficient to support
a durational residence requirement which deprives some bona fide residents of
the right to vote and thus imposes a penalty on the right of interstate travel,
it is difficult to imagine how a durational residence requirement for divorce,
which has a similar effect, could be supported by any stronger state interest.
Blumstein involved the right to interstate travel and the right to vote in a
state election, which, for purposes of equal protection at least, were considered
fundamental." 5 The inability to obtain a divorce undoubtedly would deter a
party seeking one from moving to another state; thus, durational residence
requirements penalize the exercise of the right to interstate travel. Although
there is no "right" to divorce, Boddie at least stands for the proposition that
once a state makes divorce available, it may not restrict the relief provided by a
dissolution of a "fundamental human relationship" to only a portion of its
citizens unless such a restriction is supported by a state interest of "overriding
significance."' 5 The effect of a durational residence requirement is to deny
relief to some citizens of the state, and therefore, for purposes of equal protection as well as due process, the limitation of this right, once the right is
given, involves the deprivation of a fundamental right of citizens of that state.
Blumstein treated the right to vote in state elections as fundamental, though
not constitutionally required, once the right is given to some citizens of the
state; there is no apparent bar to the application of this reasoning to the
right of relief by divorce, once that right is given to some citizens.
is not concerned with actual domicile, what possible justification is there for a residence
requirement which gives some non-residents a cause of action but denies it to some persons
domiciled within the state? How can Hawaii assert an interest in admitted non-residents
sufficient to allow alteration of their marital status, while at the same time denying sufficient
interest in its own bona fide citizens to give them a cause of action? Even if the court
succeeded in avoiding Boddie by characterizing the requirements as substantive, such a
characterization is irrelevant under Shapiro, which involved such a substantive bar to receipt of welfare payments.
See notes 136-39 supra, and accompanying text.
'See
notes 94-118 supra, and accompanying text.
"'6See notes 137-39 supra, and accompanying text. See also text accompanying and immediately following note 154 supra.
..See notes 94-118 supra, and accompanying text.
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IV. STATE-SUPPORTED HIGHER EDUCATION

Free public education is now taken for granted by most citizens. Generally,
the availability of such education through the high school level is conditioned
only upon physical presence within the boundaries of the school district; minors
may attend school wherever they are living, regardless of the fact that their
domicile technically is wherever their parents or guardian reside. Although the
expenses of maintaining a public school system are normally borne only by
residents of the school district, persons in the tax base evidently have been
willing to pay for the education of a child whose only relationship to the
district is that he happens to be present there when school starts. This generous
attitude, however, has been generally confined to the first twelve years of
public education. Commonly, a distinction is made between residents and nonresidents regarding the tuition payable in order to attend state-supported colleges and universities: if higher education is not made available to residents
at no charge, they will at least be required to pay less than non-residents. As
a practical matter, states with higher quality colleges and universities, or those
with other attractive natural features, such as mountains or beaches, have
found that non-residents may consider attending college in such states desirable.
Since students of college age are much more likely to leave home to go to
school than are those under eighteen, the fear of some states that their educational systems will be hard-pressed to handle a flood of non-residents is wellfounded. The question with which we are concerned, however, is whether a
state may constitutionally charge non-residents higher tuition than residents,
and, if so, whether the distinction may be made by the use of a durational
residence requirement.
Before examining the problem as it relates to the right of interstate travel,
it should be noted that, for purposes of equal protection, there has not been
authoritatively established a right to education. Although several commentators
and some courts have thought that the line of school desegration cases beginning with Brown v. Board of Education' established such a right, the better
view is that those cases turned on discrimination based on race, never reaching
the question of whether education per se is a fundamental right. 9 There are
158347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"..In Brown the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society ....
In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493. That this was merely dictum was made clear by the Court's holding: "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws ......
Id. at 495. Subsequent per curiam decisions indicate that the Court was
concerned with segregation of any public facilities and not particularly educational ones.
See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(parks); Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). See also
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prison facilities); Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom).
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cases involving school financing which have recognized a right to education in
dealing with discrimination based on the wealth of individual school districts,'
but these cases have not yet reached the Supreme Court.'
Higher tuition charges for non-residents have traditionally been held constitutional as a reasonable means for a state to secure cost equalization, the
rationale being that residents have already, to some extent, paid for the cost
of higher education by paying taxes, whereas non-residents have made no such
contribution."' The courts have continued to sustain this practice even after
Shapiro, generally avoiding that case by citing to the limiting footnote in the
opinion.' One recent such case is Thompson v., Board of Regents,'04 in which
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld that state's durational residence requirement. Essentially, the court's reasoning was that since higher tuition for nonresidents was not a penalty on the exercise of the right of interstate travel, the
compelling interest test was not involved, and, therefore, the discrimination
could be upheld as reasonable. As authority for the proposition that higher
tuition for non-residents does not constitute a penalty on the exercise of the
right to interstate travel, the court relied on the decision of a three-judge
federal court in Starns v. Malkerson," which was affirmed without opinion by
the United States Supreme Court.' " The district court in Starns, however, relied
on a case from the California court of appeals, Kirk v. Board of Regents,"'
in which a durational residence requirement was upheld as reasonable. It is
clear, however, that Shapiro forbids discrimination in state services between
citizens of the state based on tax contributions.' These courts have missed the
thrust of Shapiro-thata durational residence requirement per se discriminates
between bona fide residents, and is thus a penalty on the exercise of the right to
' See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1972), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 6, 1972) (No. 1332); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
'The Supreme Court will review Rodriguez during the 1972 term. Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 6, 1972) (No. 1332).
Although the status of the "right" to education is similar to that of the "right" to vote
in state elections prior to Blumstein, in the sense that education has been characterized as
an essential attribute of democracy, citizenship, and the American way, recognition of education as a fundamental right would result in problems not encountered in the voting context. Voting involves only the question of who may vote a few times a year, and the.procedures are relatively simple; i.e., the state has very few (if any) additional burdens as
a result of Blumstein. Education, however, would involve many complex questions were it
characterized as fundamental for purposes of equal protection. For example, would the
state's duty extend only through the first twelve grades? What would be required regarding
quality? Would the right extend to retarded children? Who would determine whether the
state was adequately fulfilling its duty? What does "adequate" mean? Although such problems should be considered irrelevant if education is found to be a fundamental right, undoubtedly the effect of such a characterization would play a large part in determining the
extent of the "right."
'See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd, 406 F.2d
883 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 862 (1969).
16 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. The text of that footnote is quoted in the text accompanying
note 175 intra.
'"4187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
...326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
16401 U.S. 985 (1971).
107273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554
(1970).
168394- U.S. at 632-33.
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interstate travel which can be justified only by a compelling state interest.
Obviously, higher tuition for persons who may be bona fide residents constitutes a penalty; surely, no state would assert that it could tax new residents
more heavily to achieve cost equalization, but this is the effect of higher tuition
for residents who have not satisfied a durational residence requirement.
Cost equalization, then, will not supply a durational residence requirement;
Shapiro clearly forbids it. Again, however, it should be noted that the prohibition of Shapiro is directed at discrimination between residents, not discrimination between residents and non-residents. Obviously, however the distinction
is made, non-residents will be deterred from entering a state to go to school
by higher tuition charges. This penalty may be justifiable. The argument that
a state's duties extend only to its citizens and that cost equalization is, therefore,
permissible gains credence when used to justify discrimination against persons who are not its citizens and do not intend to become citizens. " ' Similarly,
arguments based on overcrowding of colleges and inability to provide quality
education might show compelling interests in making the resident/non-resident
distinction. It is inconceivable, however, that these interests would be any more
compelling than fiscal integrity or purity of the ballot box in support of a
durational residence requirement.!" Thus, the exercise of the right to interstate
travel, as recognized in Shapiro and Blumstein, may not be penalized by charging persons who may in fact be bona fide residents higher tuition only because a
durational residence requirement has not been met. It would be relatively
easy for states to make the resident/non-resident distinction in this context.
Since unemancipated minors are generally presumed to retain the domicile
of their parents, a state could possibly require some objective evidence of emancipation (e.g., marriage) before granting resident status. ' In any event, the
irrebuttable presumption of non-residence embodied in a durational residence
requirement cannot be justified in this context any more than in any other
context.
...
For example, it has been estimated that Colorado would lose $20 million, California
$17 million, and Texas $8 million if non-resident tuition charges were abolished. See Hawkins, Should Out-of-Staters Pay More?, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 22, 1972, S D, at 2,
cols. 3-5. The costs of education, however, would remain the same, necessitating higher
taxes for citizens in order to keep the system operating.
170 The discriminatory effect is compounded when a state imposes special residence requirements on students. For example, the Nebraska statute involved in Thompson v. Board
of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971), provided that no residence could
be established by a person in attendance at a state college or university, regardless of satisfaction of the normal 4 months durational residence requirement. NEB. REV. STAT. S
85-502 (1943). After the lower court decision in Thompson, the statute was revised to
eliminate this provision, but the durational residence requirement was lengthened to one
year. 188 N.W.2d at 845-46. Prior to revision, this statute was clearly unconstitutional
under Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). See notes 64-70 supra, and accompanying
text.
"' This emancipation criterion would be only logical in this situation, and would appear to be a reasonable method of distinguishing residents from non-residents by objective
evidence which, under Blumstein, the Court would be willing to allow. Factors which would
be relevant are, for example, whether the student is employed, whether he is paying his
own expenses, where he lives (i.e., dormitory, apartment, renting a house, or buying a
house), and whether he remains in the state while school is discontinued for the summer
and holidays or returns to his parents' home. Similarly, an unemancipated minor whose
parents have moved into the state should be entitled to show that both he and his parents
are residents of the state.
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V. CONCLUSION

The decision in Blumstein removed any doubt that discrimination based on
the recent exercise of the right to interstate travel is sufficient to invoke the
new equal protection test. Although the case also involved the right of a citizen to vote in state elections-which the court considered a fundamental right
for purposes of equal protection-Justice Marshall stated that "whether we
look to the benefit withheld by the classification (the opportunity to vote) or
the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude that the
State must show a substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational
residence requirements.""1 ' The Court emphasized that the constitutionality of a
requirement that voters be bona fide residents of the state was not in issue, but
noted that an "appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of
bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny." '
Thus, state interests insufficient to support a durational residence requirement
may yet be sufficient to support some discrimination between bona fide residents
and non-residents, such as allowing only bona fide residents to vote in state
elections. In Shapiro, the court noted that, since a state has a valid interest in
preserving its fiscal integrity, it may legitimately attempt to limit expenditures,
although it "may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. ' Presumably, then, a state's fiscal integrity could
be a compelling interest for purposes of distinguishing between citizens and
non-citizens, i.e., residents and non-residents; if so, a state can constitutionally
deny welfare benefits and lower tuition rates to non-residents. The denial of
divorce to non-residents could likewise be justified by the expense of maintaining a judicial system; not only would decrees granted non-residents probably
be denied full faith and credit, but states with relatively liberal grounds for
divorce would find their courts inundated with suits by non-residents. In all
probability, discrimination between residents and non-residents may be justified
by compelling interests in all of the areas under discussion.
It appears, however, that virtually any durational residency requirement is
not a constitutionally permissible means of distinguishing residents from nonresidents for purposes of determining who may enjoy state "rights," because
such a requirement penalizes newly arrived bona fide residents for the exercise
of the right to interstate travel. Post-Shapiro decisions upholding durational
residence requirements have generally avoided that case by relying on a footnote to the opinion, in which the Court stated: "We imply no view of the
validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to
vote, eligibilty for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the
exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel."'' Blumstein made clear
that the term penalties is not to be defined technically: "Durational residence
172405 U.S. at 335.

...
Id. at 343-44.
174394 U.S. at 633.
75
'
Id. at 638 n.21.
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laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their
prohibitions on only those persons who have recently exercised that right."'76
Thus, the penalty involved is the denial of the benefits of resident status to
persons who may, in fact, be bona fide residents. Such discrimination itself
constitutes a penalty, and any durational residence requirement therefore imposes a penalty which can be justified only by a compelling state interest.
Blumstein also indicated that there is probably no state interest compelling
enough to justify the imposition of a durational residence requirement: "[11f
there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden
on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference.""' If neither fiscal integrity nor purity of the ballot box
are sufficiently compelling, it is difficult to conceive of any state interest which
would be so compelling. As the court indicated in Blumstein, there are other
reasonable ways to distinguish residents from non-residents; for example,
requiring a declaration of domiciliary intent supported by some objective evidence. Criminal sanctions are available in order to discourage fraud.'
In each of the areas discussed in this Comment, it is apparent that a state
'could have a compelling interest in treating residents and non-residents differently. It is also apparent, however, that no durational residence requirement
can be used to separate residents from non-residents because the conclusive
presumption of non-residence resulting from such a requirement operates to
deprive some bona fide residents of the benefits of state citizenship enjoyed by
other residents. In the voting context, Blumstein indicates that a state may
close its registration books to all residents a reasonable length of time before an
election in order to complete the administrative process involved in setting up
an election. This test, as applied to welfare and college tuition, would apparently mean that the question of bona fide residence must be determined
within the period designated by the state as that required for administrative
tasks to be completed regarding the application of any resident. Since divorce
normally does not involve any administrative procedures, it is doubtful that
any such waiting period would be permissible-a determination of residence
could easily be, and normally is, made in the divorce proceeding itself.
The effect of the abolition of durational residence requirements would be
to prevent a state from arbitrarily determining who will be accorded the status
of a resident. In the overview, if a state is actually interested in distinguishing
residents from non-residents, there should be no objection to allowing recently
arrived residents to show that they intend to make the state their home. In
the case of voting, such a showing could be as simple as producing evidence of
cancelled registration in the prior jurisdiction in order to register in the new
176405 U.S. at 342.

'"Id.at 343.

17.Since Tennessee normally required only an oath before registration, the Court reasoned that a person intent on committing fraud would not be prevented from doing so by
having to swear that he had fulfilled the residence requirement. Id. at 346. Logically, prevention of fraud could be more efficiently accomplished by requiring some objective evidence of domiciliary intent, which makes a durational residence requirement unnecessary. If
qualification is determined only by oath, the only persons deterred from committing fraud
by a durational residence requirement are those who would not perjure themselves in any

event.
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domicile; in the other areas, evidence such as acquisition of housing or a job
would likewise be easy to produce. Certainly, such a system would be fairer, as
well as more effective in preventing fraud, than the indiscriminate sweep of
a durational residence requirement.

